Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good, 1st Edition eBook
$39.99
Most philosophers working in moral psychology and practical reason think that either the notion of "good" or the notion of "desire" have central roles to play in our understanding of intentional explanations and practical reasoning.
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About this eTextbook
Most philosophers working in moral psychology and practical reason think that either the notion of "good" or the notion of "desire" have central roles to play in our understanding of intentional explanations and practical reasoning. However, philosophers disagree sharply over how we are supposed to understand the notions of "desire" and "good", how these notions relate, and whether both play a significant and independent role in practical reason. In particular, the "Guise of the Good" thesis - the view that desire (or perhaps intention, or intentional action) always aims at the good - has received renewed attention in the last twenty years.
Can one have desire for things that the desirer does not perceive to be good in any, or form intentions to act in way that one does not deem to be good? Does the notion of good play any essential role in an account of deliberation or practical reason? Moreover, philosophers also disagree about the relevant notion of good.
Is it a purely formal notion, or does it involve a substantive conception of the good? Is the primary notion, the notion of the good for a particular agent, or the notion of good simpliciter? Does the relevant notion of good make essential appeal to human nature, or would it in principle extend to all rational beings?
While these questions are central in contemporary work in ethics, practical reason, and philosophy of action, they are not new; similar issues were discussed in the ancient period. This volume of essays aims to bring together "systematic" and more historically-oriented work on these issues.
Publication details
- Author: Sergio Tenenbaum
- Publisher: Oxford University Press
- eText ISBN: 9780199700165, 0199700168
- Print ISBN: 9780195382440, 0195382447
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About this eTextbook
Most philosophers working in moral psychology and practical reason think that either the notion of "good" or the notion of "desire" have central roles to play in our understanding of intentional explanations and practical reasoning. However, philosophers disagree sharply over how we are supposed to understand the notions of "desire" and "good", how these notions relate, and whether both play a significant and independent role in practical reason. In particular, the "Guise of the Good" thesis – the view that desire (or perhaps intention, or intentional action) always aims at the good – has received renewed attention in the last twenty years.
Can one have desire for things that the desirer does not perceive to be good in any, or form intentions to act in way that one does not deem to be good? Does the notion of good play any essential role in an account of deliberation or practical reason? Moreover, philosophers also disagree about the relevant notion of good.
Is it a purely formal notion, or does it involve a substantive conception of the good? Is the primary notion, the notion of the good for a particular agent, or the notion of good simpliciter? Does the relevant notion of good make essential appeal to human nature, or would it in principle extend to all rational beings?
While these questions are central in contemporary work in ethics, practical reason, and philosophy of action, they are not new; similar issues were discussed in the ancient period. This volume of essays aims to bring together "systematic" and more historically-oriented work on these issues.
Publication details
- Author: Sergio Tenenbaum
- Publisher: Oxford University Press
- eText ISBN: 9780199700165, 0199700168
- Print ISBN: 9780195382440, 0195382447
What you receive
- A licensed digital edition of this title, supplied as PDF or EPUB. The format is set by the publisher, so email us the ISBN before ordering and we will confirm which one it is.
- Delivered to the email address on your order as a secure download link, usually within minutes and always within 24 hours of payment.
- Download links do not expire and there is no cap on re-downloads. Readable on any computer, tablet or phone, online or offline.
- This is a digital edition. Nothing is printed, packed or posted, and there is no delivery charge.
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